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Beginning in the mid-1940s with the creation of the Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter),1 the ability to adjudicate claims of human rights abuses under international law has 
increased dramatically.  In response to the Second World War and the enormous abuses that 
became a part of the intimate knowledge of the war’s survivors, states took active steps to 
address the atrocities by creating norms and by creating institutions to adjudicate those norms.2  
The inception of the UN Charter spurred a global effort to promote and protect human rights 
within the legal arena and encouraged the development of a wide variety of conventions 
throughout many regions of the world.3  Within Latin America, regional protection arose via the 
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1 U.N. CHARTER, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993 (entered into force 24 Oct. 1945) [hereinafter U.N. 
CHARTER]. 
2 This certainly is not the first time in history that states came together to foster human rights.  For example, the 
Treaty of Vienna (1815) was developed to enforce the formal prohibition of the slave trade, and the first Geneva 
Conventions in 1864 developed the General Act of Brussels and the protection of the wounded and sick in wartime.  
In 1919, the Covenant of the League of Nations led the way for the codification of human dignity over states’ 
interests.  Moreover, the rise of international norms similarly encouraged the increased protection for minority 
groups, guaranteeing basic rights across universal classes.  See Declaration of Eight Courts Relative to the Universal 
Abolition of the Slave Trade, Feb. 8, 1815, 63 Consol. T.S. 473; Declaration of the General Act of the Brussels 
Conference, July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886, T.S. No. 383; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT available in 
HAROLD S. QUIGLEY, FROM VERSAILLES TO LOCARNO: A SKETCH OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION at 90 (1927). 
3 To name only a few: American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 
36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]; see also European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 
amended by Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 
1994, Eur. T. S. No. 155, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm (last visited Jan. 
13, 2006); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
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Inter-American system for human rights based on the American Convention on Human Rights, 
which created both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.  Comprehensive international accountability now is an ideal that has 
“captured the imagination of mankind,” and the process of democratization seems irreversible 
within Latin America.4
Although the system has been in place for over two decades, many procedures within the 
Inter-American system for human rights remain unclear.  Two of these processes are the 
doctrines of reservations and declarations.  As the Inter-American Court has applied these 
practices within its jurisprudence, a rather unpredictable and seemingly heterogeneous body of 
law has developed.  This obscurity detrimentally affected the first contentious case ever brought 
to the Inter-American Court against the state of El Salvador—Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs. El 
Salvador.5  In Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz, the Court upheld a preliminary objection to ratione 
temporis submitted by El Salvador when it accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.6  The State’s 
restriction was improper both substantively and procedurally, but the Court held the limitation to 
be valid under the American Convention.   
In Part I, this article will review international human rights accountability in general and 
the Latin American system in particular.  Part II will consider the tools that nations have for 
maintaining autonomy even as they enter into international treaties.  Specifically, Part II will 
highlight the similarities in and differences between the doctrines of reservations and  
                                                                                                                                                             
into force 23 Mar. 1976); International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976). 
4 Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 
703, 704, 716 (1997). 
5 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs. El Salvador [Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador], (Merits), Judgment of March 1, 
2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., , (ser. C) No. 120, at ¶ 48(2) (2005), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf/seriec_120_esp.pdf (last visited May 30, 2006).    
6 For the purposes of this paper, the term “competence” will be used interchangeably with “jurisdiction.”  In the 
Inter-American parlance, the term employed is competencia, which most directly translates to “jurisdiction” in 
English.   
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declarations.  In Part III, litigation of reservations and declarations is considered, with a focus on 
the Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz case.  Part III will closely evaluate the inconsistencies within 
the Inter-American Court’s reasoning in Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz and will suggest that at a 
minimum, the Court amend its procedural allowances for reservations and declarations.  In the 
alternative, serious consideration should be given to prohibiting reservations and declarations to 
the American Convention in their entirety.  Part IV of this article will identify some future 
opportunities to challenge the law that exists after Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz, ultimately 
concluding that the protection of non-derogable human rights must not be circumvented using 
the doctrines of reservations and declarations.  
I. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Human Rights Accountability: An Overview 
 
Throughout the world, international human rights are playing an augmented role in the 
protection of both individual human rights and the rights of states.  The system has two 
categories of protection: those rights that are classified as personal, protected in criminal and tort 
suits brought against individual perpetrators, and those rights seen as the responsibility of states, 
protected in suits brought directly against the state.  Through the increased development and 
refinement of both types of protection, the prosecution of human rights abusers is expanding.  
The system of individual responsibility, where particular human rights abusers are held 
responsible, is pursued  in both criminal and  civil law.  It is within this type of adjudication that 
former Latin American dictators increasingly are being held accountable.  A current example of 
such a suit is the effort underway to hold General Augusto Pinochet responsible before the 
international community for the many breaches of human rights norms that were committed 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 84 (2006). 
 
during his reign as the head of the state of Chile.7  In some cases, individuals have been civilly 
sued in District Courts in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute, and, increasingly, under 
the legal theory of command responsibility.8  In addition, courts have utilized principles of 
universal jurisdiction, which allows countries like Spain to hold individuals accountable for 
human rights violations abroad.9
The second category of international accountability involves cases brought against entire 
countries rather than against individual nations’ leaders. This type of case may arise either within 
a regional system or within the UN system of human rights.  The protection of human rights is 
part of the conglomerate of the UN’s six “principal organs,” which are: the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Trusteeship 
Council, and the Economic and Social Council.10  In addition, protection has strengthened 
through the creation of the UN Human Rights Committee11 and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)12 during the late 1970s, when the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICEAFRD) were entered into force.13 As is true in the latter 
                                                 
7 See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 
(2001). 
8 See generally Francisco Rivera, Inter-American Justice: Now Available in a U.S. Federal Court  Near You, 45 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 889 (2005); Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of Proof in 
Romagoza v. Garcia, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213 (2003). 
9 See generally Rigoberta Menchú y otros [Rigoberta Menchú et al.], STC 237/2005, Sept. 26, 2005 available at 
http://www.tribunalconsitutcional.es/JC.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); see also Sentencia por crímenes contra la 
humanidad en el caso Adolfo Scilingo [Sentencing for crimes against humanity in the Adolfo Scilingo case], 
Audiencia Nacional, Sumario 19/1997, Rollo de Sala 139/1997, Juzgado C. Instrucción No. 5, April 19, 2005 
available at http://derechos.org/nizkor/espana/juicioral/doc/sentencia.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). 
10 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, art. 7. 
11 The Human Rights Committee is a treaty body that ensures compliance with the ICCPR. 
12 Though the CERD now may be obsolete due to various recent changes, its development initially was quite 
meaningful. 
13 The UN Human Rights Commission is an additional body that is responsible for encouraging compliance as a part 
of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  Like the Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR, The UN Human 
Rights Commission may not hear lawsuits based on breaches of the treaties.  Rather, there is an allowance for 
complaints against states to be brought before them.  The Commission’s principle function generally has been to 
prepare the texts of the Universal Declaration, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, and the drafting of 
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developments, these systems are based on multilateral treaties that may be evoked against 
breaching states. 
Although human rights norms are drafted with universal applicability, regional systems 
based on specific, multilateral treaties incorporate the cultural, social, political, and economic 
needs of regional geographies.  Because of their closer connection to particular regions, regional 
systems have been uniquely effective.  This effectiveness results from uncommon 
understandings of events at hand, the ability to take cultural makeup into account, and anomalous 
regional legitimacy.  Although much is yet to be accomplished, the creation of regional 
regulations has aided in the establishment of greater legal uniformity. 
B. The Structure of the Latin American System 
 1. An Overview 
 
The Latin American system of human rights accountability centers on the American 
Convention on Human Rights (American Convention),14 which gave birth both to the Inter-
American Commission and to the Inter-American Court.15  Most countries in the region—except 
the United States, Canada, and various Caribbean Island nations—have ratified the American 
Convention.16  Currently, twenty-four of thirty-four Member States to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) have both signed and ratified the instrument.17   
                                                                                                                                                             
various accompanying covenants to Universal Declaration.  See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW at 575-578 (1998). 
14 American Convention, supra note 3. 
15 Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 437-493 at 447 (Theodor Meron ed, 1984). 
16 Organization of American States, Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic4.htm (last visited May 30, 2006). 
17 These 24 states include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Organization of American States, Signatures and Current 
Status of Ratifications, in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/I.4 rev. 8, 48 (May 22, 2001), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. 
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The American Convention contains eighty-two articles and codifies a set of twenty-six 
rights that the Commission and the Court are to protect.18  These include, but are not limited to: 
the right to life, right to humane treatment, freedom from slavery, right to personal liberty, right 
to a fair trial, right to compensation, right to privacy, freedom of conscience and religion, 
freedom of thought and expression, right of assembly, freedom of association, right to 
nationality, right to property, freedom of movement and residence, and right to equal 
protection.19  Under this Convention, the States Parties agree to “respect” and “ensure” the “free 
and full exercise” of these rights “to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.”20
Pursuant to the American Convention, regional accountability in Latin America is 
implemented as part of a two-level structure where cases are heard.  First, cases are presented 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and second, before the Inter-American 
Court for Human Rights.  The procedures before both bodies are governed by a strict set of 
guidelines that dramatically restrict the amount and types of cases heard.  Although there is 
considerable overlap between the two procedural regulations, this article primarily will concern 
itself with the Court’s procedural rules. 
2. Bringing a Case to the Court 
For a human rights case to be heard before the Inter-American Court, the case usually 
first must be heard by the Inter-American Commission and the jurisdiction of the Court must be 
accepted by the state.21 The Court is empowered with three types of jurisdiction: provisional 
measures,22 advisory opinions,23 and contentious opinions.24  With the exception of the Court’s 
                                                 
18 See, generally, American Convention, supra note 3. 
19 Id., arts. 4-8, 10-13, 15-16, 20-22, 24. 
20 Id., art. 1(1). 
21 See id., art. 63-64. 
22 As granted by Article 63.2 of the American Convention, the Court has the power to act “in cases of extreme 
gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons.” See id., art. 63.2. 
23 See id., art. 63.  
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advisory jurisdiction, cases first must pass through the Commission.25  In this sense, the 
Commission acts as a gatekeeper for the Court in contentious cases. 
As a threshold requirement for a case to reach the Commission, the petitioners must have 
exhausted all domestic remedies in their home country.26  In the alternative, the petitioners must 
make a showing that the remedies provided were denied, did not comply with due process 
standards, or were unreasonably delayed.27  The petition also must meet temporal jurisdiction 
requirements.28  After these initial requirements are met, the Commission may proceed with the 
case pursuant to its role as a fact finder.29  When possible, the parties in the dispute will reach a 
friendly settlement.  However, if a settlement cannot be achieved, the Commission will prepare a 
report announcing both the facts it takes to be true and also the legal conclusions reached in the 
case.30  Following the release of the Commission’s report, the dispute may be referred to the 
Court for further adjudication on the merits.31  
                                                                                                                                                             
24 See id., art. 64. 
25 Advisory jurisdiction is triggered when a member state of the OAS, the Inter-American Commission, or a 
recognized OAS organ requests that the Court either interpret the American Convention or interpret another treaty 
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. The purpose of the advisory function is to aid 
states and organs to adhere to and correctly apply various human rights treaties without subjecting them to the 
formalism and sanctions associated with the contentious judicial process. See id., art. 64; see also Organization of 
American States, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2003), art. 60, in BASIC 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 17. 
26 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 46(1)(a). 
27 See id., art. 46. 
28 Namely, this means that the petition usually must be filed within six months of the final decision in the relevant 
domestic system. See id., art. 46(1)(b). 
29 This either may take the form of requesting documents and materials from the parties or may take the form of an 
in loco visit to gather relevant information.  Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra 
note 25. 
30 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 50. 
31 At this time, the purported victims may not refer a case to the Inter-American Court. As provided by Article 23 of 
the Rules of Procedure, the alleged victims may participate in the case “when the application has been admitted.”   
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 23.  Despite the amended rules 
of procedure, the victim’s role within the system is still one of the most frequent criticisms of the Inter-American 
system’s procedure at this time, since it does recognize an active role for the victim.  Many scholars believe that 
because petitioners can bring a case before the Commission, they also should be able to do so with respect to the 
Court.  See, generally, JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, at 19 (2003). 
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 If a case is referred to the Inter-American Court, it will fall within the Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction.32  At that time, the Court will review the facts and the Commission’s report33 as 
well as briefs and supporting documentary evidence submitted by the representatives of the 
purported victims34 and by the state.35  Though the Commission previously acted more as a 
representative for the purported victims, its role currently is seen as procedural, and thus the 
adversarial dispute is between the purported victim and the state.36  Following the presentation of 
facts in the case, the judges of the tribunal will evaluate the evidence and determine whether 
there are any violations of the American Convention. 
If the Court finds that there is a violation of a right or freedom that otherwise would be 
protected by the American Convention, it may rule on whether the state is in violation of the 
identified norm and it also may require that the injured party receive the enjoyment of such rights 
or freedoms.  When appropriate, the Court also may find that the consequences of the measure or 
situation constituting the breach must be remedied and that fair compensation must be paid to the 
victim.37  The Court’s decision is obligatory and without appeal.   
                                                 
32 Though the Court’s advisory jurisdiction is important, it is unnecessary to discuss that jurisdiction at this time, 
because the reservation doctrine in question is relevant only in the contentious context.  For an extensive discussion 
of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, see Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights Law, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 241 (2002); 
see also Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1 (1985). 
33 The Commission appears as a complaining party in contentious cases; in this capacity, the Commission serves as 
an objective, impartial participant, rather than an adversarial party advocating for the victim. Organization of 
American States, Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 28, adopted by the General Assembly of 
the OAS at its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October, 1979 (Resolution No. 488) in BASIC 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 17. 
34 The representatives of the purported victims are permitted to appear in court pursuant to Article 23(2) of the 2001 
Rules of Procedure, which provides: “When there are several alleged victims, next of kin or duly accredited 
representatives, they shall designate a common intervenor who shall be the only person authorized to present 
pleadings, motions and evidence during the proceedings, including the public hearings.” Rules of Procedure of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 23(2). 
35 PASQUALUCCI, supra note 31, at 16. 
36 Under the 2001 amended Rules of Procedure, the Commission’s role is envisioned as merely procedural.  Rules of 
Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra note 25, art 2(23). 
37 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 63(1). 
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As previously stated, the Court’s contentious jurisdiction is based on state consent.  
Therefore, contentious jurisdiction only may arise when a state specifically submits to the 
Court’s jurisdiction,38 either on an ipso facto or on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, if a state is not 
willing to grant the Court general jurisdiction, it may independently submit itself to limited 
recognition of the Tribunal’s competence.39  Such a declaration is submitted pursuant to Article 
62 of the American Convention, and may be conditional or unconditional. 40  The mere 
ratification of the Court’s statute, without more, is taken as an ipso facto approval of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  However, where a country wishes to avail itself of the Court in specific 
circumstances only, the state may accept jurisdiction on a case-by-cases basis, for a set category 
of cases, or for all potential cases brought against it.41   Usually, conditions imposed by states 
include limits imposed on the subject matter, personal, or temporal jurisdiction of the Court.42
II. MAINTAINING STATE AUTONOMY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
A. State Sovereignty through Reservations and Declarations  
In this treaty-based system founded primarily on state consent, countries have the 
opportunity to retain their sovereignty via both substantive reservations to the American 
                                                 
38 The following OAS Member States have accepted the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction: 
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago 
(denounced the Convention on May 26, 1998), Uruguay, and Venezuela.  See Signatures and Current Status of 
Ratifications, supra note 17. 
39 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 62(2). See also: PASQUALUCCI, supra note31, at 87-89. 
40 Specifically, this provision provides: 
[A] State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this 
Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not 
requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Convention.  Such declaration may be made unconditionally, 
on the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases. 
American Convention, supra note 3, art. 62 (1-2).  In addition, the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction may not be 
renounced independently of the American Convention.  If a state initially accepts the Court’s jurisdiction, it may not 
remove itself from the reach of the tribunal without denouncing the American Convention.  This rule first was 
established in Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, (Competence), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of Sept. 24, 1999, (Ser. C) No. 
54, ¶¶ 40, 46 (1999). 
41 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 62. 
42 PASQUALUCCI, supra note31, at 87. 
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Convention and procedural declarations limiting the Court’s jurisdiction.43  In theory, these two 
mechanisms should maintain a balance between individual rights and state autonomy.  
However, “[w]idely divergent and political economic systems”44 exist within the context 
of international human rights law, though the body of law aims to achieve the  uniform 
protection of rights.  Treaty reservations and declarations often are permitted in the hope that 
these mechanisms will allow states to become parties to multilateral treaties without 
subordinating domestic law and principles to international interests.  Indeed, “the formulation of 
reservations, far from impairing the integrity of treaties, provides a satisfactory means of 
eliminating avoidable difficulties that might stand in the way of international co-operation.”45  In 
practice, the roles each mechanism plays and the impacts they each have often is unclear or 
ambiguous. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 46 which governs treaties between states, 
defines a reservation as a “unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
                                                 
43 Though the terms “reservation” and “declaration” mean two separate things for international law of treaties, that 
meaning has been blurred in the Latin American system.  Therefore, though a careful distinction is made between 
the two in this section, the reader should take note that the qualitative difference between the terms often is minute 
or imperceptible. 
44 T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES, at 27 (1974). 
45 See id. 
46 For the purposes of this paper, “Vienna Convention” will be used in reference to the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.  Though it is geared towards states, its provisions have been adopted by the Inter-American 
system.  The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations also discusses reservations, but its terms are nearly identical to that of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, with most provisions simply adding the term “international organization” where states are 
discussed. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations, March 21, 1986, U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15, reprinted in 
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations, Official Records, Documents of the Conference, vol. II, 94 (1995), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/trbtstat.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
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state.”47  Thus reservations are enacted with the intent to “exclude or modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects in 
their application to the State or to the international organization which formulates the 
reservation.”48  
A declaration, on the other hand, is a statement in which a state announces that it 
understands a treaty in a specific way.  The definition of an interpretive declaration is nearly 
identical to that of a reservation; as announced in 1999 by the International Law Commission, a 
declaration is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or by an 
international organization whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify 
the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain treaty provisions.”49  
Logically, a declaration is considered a conditional interpretive declaration when a state 
conditions its intent to be bound on its own declarative interpretation of an instrument.50   
Generally, the distinction between a reservation and a declaration is made with respect 
only to the legal effect that the state’s action has on the treaty.51  Though the difference between 
reservations and declarations often is unclear and the Vienna Convention provides no guidance, 
some attention  has been given to clarifying the roles reservations and declarations play in 
international law.  As the International Law Commission stated in its recent report on the topic,  
Notwithstanding the apparent silence of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions 
on this phenomenon, States have always felt that they could attach to their 
expression of consent to be bound by multilateral treaty declarations whereby 
                                                 
47 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 2 (1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis 
added), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last visited Jan. 
12, 2006) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
48 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-First Session, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶ 1.1.1,, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (1999), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_54_10.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter International 
Law Commission Report]. 
49 Id., ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶ 1.2 (emphasis added).  
50 See id., ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶. 1.2.1.   
51 See id., ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶ 1.3. 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 92 (2006). 
 
they indicate the spirit in which they agree to be bound; these declarations do not, 
however, seek to modify or exclude the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty and thus do not constitute reservations, but interpretative declarations.52
 
Therefore, interpretive declarations—conditional or otherwise—are not intended to change the 
legal effect of the document, while reservations are intended to do precisely that.53   
States may use both declarations and reservations, but unfortunately they do not always 
do so in good faith.  In fact, states often obscure the distinction between the two “by giving the 
name of ‘declarations’ to instruments that are obviously and unquestionably real reservations.” 54 
In doing so, states "hope not to arouse the vigilance of the other States' Parties while attaining the 
same objectives; conversely, to give greater weight to declarations that clearly have no legal 
effect on the provisions of a treaty, they label them 'reservations', even though under the terms of 
the Vienna definition they are not.”55  States generally have been permitted to make reservations 
to treaties because the interest of broad state participation within a system generally outweighs 
the desire for universal application of the law.  However, reservations are not without necessary 
limitations.  The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion in Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide56 established the 
earliest guidelines for reservation procedure.   In that case, the ICJ considered the availability of 
reservations under the Genocide Convention, which contained no provision for reservations or 
for the interpretation of reservations.  Within the first two years of the Convention’s use, eight 
different states had made a total of eighteen reservations to the treaty,57 and the General 
                                                 
52 See id., ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶ 1.2, cmt. 1. 
53 As shall be discussed later, some declarations, such as those placing a limit on ratione temporis, may change the 
legal effect of a human rights treaty. 
54 International Law Commission Report, supra note 48, ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶ 1.2, cmt. 5. 
55 See id., ch 6, draft guidelines, ¶ 1.2, cmt. 5. 
56 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 
1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). 
57 Id. at 17-18. 
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Assembly challenged the validity and effects of the reservations.58  Ultimately, the Court 
determined that the attempted reservation to the Genocide Convention was against the object and 
purpose of the treaty.59  Most importantly, the ICJ detailed the procedural and substantive 
framework for implementing reservations. 
In most cases, states can make reservations to instruments while still being a party unless 
another country makes an objection to the reservation.  If there is no provision in a treaty, the 
ability of states to make reservations will depend on the intent of the drafters to permit such 
reservations.60  If a given reservation is consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty, then 
the reserving state still may be a party to the instrument. However, whether the treaty is enforced 
between the reserving state and an objecting state depends on the objecting state’s assessment of 
the compatibility of the reservation with the treaty.61
Because a state generally cannot be bound in international law without the state’s prior 
consent, a treaty comes into force between an objecting state and a reserving state only upon the 
objector’s consent to the reservation.  This consent may not be arbitrarily withheld, but it need 
not be granted if the objecting state determines in good faith that the reservation is outside of the 
object and purpose of the treaty.62  Moreover, if a reservation is objected to, all states that do not 
object are bound in reciprocity to the objecting state, pursuant to that country’s limit.63  Where 
objections are made, either the provision in question will be wholly removed from the treaty as 
applied between the two countries or, if the reservation is deemed improper, the reserving state 
no longer will be a party to the treaty.64   
                                                 
58 Id. at 16. 
59 Id. at 27. 
60 Id. at 24. 
61 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 56, at 26. 
62 Id. at 27. 
63 Id. at 29. 
64 Id. 
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Within Latin America, general reservations to provisions of the American Convention 
may be made pursuant to Article 75, which provides that “[t]his Convention shall be subject to 
reservations only in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties signed on May 23, 1969.”65  Thus, when interpreting whether a state’s reservation is in 
keeping with the American Convention, the Court is charged with interpreting the Vienna 
Convention’s Article 19, which reads: 
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, formulate a reservation unless: 
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not 
include the reservation in question, may be made; or 
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.66 
 
If a reservation properly adheres to Article 19, it will be deemed a valid reservation to the 
American Convention, as long as the reservation is not a departure from the object and purpose 
of the treaty.  For example, Trinidad and Tobago’s unsuccessful attempt to allow the death 
penalty to be carried out against a person over seventy years old was a direct violation of Article 
4(5) of the American Convention.67  In 1998, with the reservation’s validity pending before the 
Commission, the Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention in anticipation of an 
unfavorable decision.68  Three years later, when the case made its way to the Court, the Court 
held Trinidad’s reservation to be  against the object and purpose of the American Convention; 
the Court invalidated the reservation and found the country culpable of numerous violations to 
the Convention.69
                                                 
65 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 75. 
66 Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 19. 
67 Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Preliminary Exceptions), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of Sept. 1, 2001, (ser. C) 
No. 80, ¶ 88 (2001). 
68 The only way to remove the Court’s jurisdiction is to denounce the American Convention in its entirety. American 
Convention, supra note 3, art. 78.   
69 Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Preliminary Exceptions), supra note 67, ¶ 98. 
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Although the American Convention’s guidelines closely limit the instances in which 
reservations are appropriate, it allows declarations much more generally.  Moreover, reservations 
to the American Convention itself explicitly are permitted while declarations only are mentioned 
in the treaty in reference to the acceptance of the Court or the Commission’s jurisdiction.  
Technically, then, declarations are made in reference to the procedural rules and statutes of the 
Court or of the Commission and not to the American Convention itself. 
States may enact declarations upon acceptance of the Court’s competence and pursuant to 
Article 62 of the American Convention.  In practice, conditional interpretive declarations 
arguably may be more restrictive than “reservations” made under Article 75, because these 
declarations often will limit more individual rights provided by the American Convention.  For 
example, a reservation such as Argentina’s (which limited the treaty’s application with respect to 
Article 21 alone, thus making Argentine domestic law supreme to the American Convention)70 
had little to no legal effect on the implementation of the American Convention.  The same often 
is untrue of conditional interpretive declarations when the declarations limit ratione temporis.71  
For example, Nicaragua’s conditional interpretive declaration applied a temporal limitation to the 
Court’s jurisdiction by limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to facts occurring after the acceptance 
                                                 
70 Specifically, the text of the reservation stated: “The Argentine Government establishes that questions relating to 
the Government's economic policy shall not be subject to review by an international tribunal. Neither shall it 
consider reviewable anything the national courts may determine to be matters of 'public utility' and 'social interest', 
nor anything they may understand to be 'fair compensation'.”  See Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, in 
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 17 (for the text of each country’s reservations and declarations).  
71 To be clear, Argentina’s interpretive statements are, most likely, in keeping with the American Convention both in 
procedure and substance.  Their texts reads:  
Article 5, paragraph 3, shall be interpreted to mean that a punishment shall not be applied to any 
person other than the criminal, that is, that there shall be no vicarious criminal punishment. 
Article 7, paragraph 7, shall be interpreted to mean that the prohibition against "detention for debt" 
does not involve prohibiting the state from basing punishment on default of certain debts, when 
the punishment is not imposed for default itself but rather for a prior independent, illegal, 
punishable act. 
Article 10 shall be interpreted to mean that the "miscarriage of justice" has been established by a 
national court. 
Id. 
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date.72  At least within the context of international human rights law before the Inter-American 
Court, this declaration has the possible effect of eliminating jurisdiction over claims that 
otherwise would be considered continuing crimes.  In general, continuing crimes, pursuant to 
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention,73 fall into an exception in rules of non-retroactive 
application of the law.  However, though the Court has been somewhat inconsistent, the recent 
Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz decision seems to dictate that continuing crimes will not be heard 
on the merits when those violations were commenced before the conditional acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction.74
B. Reservations and Declarations before the Inter-American Court 
In the Inter-American system, about half of the States’ Parties have made some sort of 
declaration to the American Convention, whereas less than ten have made reservations to the 
treaty.75  Most of the declarations are procedural; they usually restrict ratione temporis either for 
an indefinite period or only past a specific date.  Conversely, reservations generally are in 
                                                 
72 Nicaragua’s declaration states:  
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Government of Nicaragua states for the record that its 
acceptance of the competence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is given for an 
indefinite period, is general in character and grounded in reciprocity, and is subject to the 
reservation that this recognition of competence applies only to cases arising solely out of events 
subsequent to, and out of acts which began to be committed after, the date of deposit of this 
declaration with the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. 
Id. 
73 Vienna Convention’s Article 28 states: “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which 
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”  Vienna Convention, 
supra note 47, art. 28. This provision may be interpreted to refer to all crimes but continuing crimes as they would 
not have “ceased to exist” as provided in the treaty.  Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate this 
scenario at this time, the Vienna Convention was incorporated into jurisdiction before the International Criminal 
Court.  See id.  The Rome Statute currently allows continuing crimes to be heard before the tribunal.  See, generally, 
Alan Nissel, Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 653 (2004). 
74 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs. El Salvador [Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador], (Preliminary Objections), 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of November 23, 2004, (ser. C) No. 118, ¶ 79 (2004).  
75 Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 17.  Here, the line between 
reservations and declarations is fine, if not blurry.  There often is very little distinction between declarations and 
reservations, and in many cases, declarations arguably are misclassified.  For that reason, it is difficult to categorize 
the exact numbers of declarations versus reservations that have been made.  Though it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to do so at this time, a future study based on such a quantitative and qualitative assessment certainly would 
prove valuable. 
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reference to specific, substantive rights.76  Some interpretive declarations, such as the one made 
by Argentina, simply proclaim the supremacy of domestic over international law,77 but others are 
more directly procedural, applying explicit limitations to the Court’s competence. Though the 
previously discussed confusion between declarations and reservations is pervasive and some 
hesitation must be exercised before classifying limitations in either category, “declarations” 
submitted under Article 62 of the treaty have been more frequent than reservations.  El Salvador 
is one of the countries that submitted a “declaration” upon its acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  When the first case against the country was brought to the Court, that limitation 
proved central to the Court’s decision. 
III. LITIGATING DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS: EL SALVADOR AND  
LAS HERMANAS SERRANO CRUZ 
 
A. El Salvador’s Temporal Limitation to the American Convention 
El Salvador ratified the American Convention in 1978, but the protection of human rights 
under the system did not play an active role in the country for nearly two decades.78  During the 
1980s, a violent civil war impacted nearly every aspect of life in El Salvador.  From 1980 to 
1991, El Salvador was “engulfed in a war which plunged Salvadorian society into violence, left 
it with thousands and thousands of people dead and exposed it to appalling crimes.”79  Estimates 
by the United Nations established 75,000 people dead and over a million displaced.80  
Unfortunately, it was not until January 16, 1992, when the seemingly reconciled parties signed 
                                                 
76 See id. 
77 See supra note 71 (Argentina’s reservation to Article 21) and accompanying text. 
78 Over twenty years passed between the date of ratification of the American Convention and the first public hearing 
against the country before the Inter-American Court. See Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, in BASIC 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 17. 
79 Security Council, Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador, U.N. Doc S/25500 at 10 (April 1, 1993) 
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) [hereinafter 
Truth Commission Report]. 
80 Nicole Hertvik, El Salvador: Effecting Change from Within, United Nations Chronicle available at 
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue3/0302p75_el_salvador.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
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the Peace Agreement in the Castle of Chapultepec, Mexico, and “brought back the light and the 
chance to re-emerge from madness to hope.”81  Up until that time, however, violence was 
systematic and “arbitrary arrests, murders and selective and indiscriminate disappearances of 
leaders became common practice.”82
Negotiators in the peace process agreed to refer human rights violations committed 
during the war to the UN Commission for the Truth (Truth Commission).83  The Truth 
Commission investigated some of the most visible crimes in the country, and its 1993 report 
specifically named individuals involved in their execution.84  In response to the blame placed on 
its officers and officials, the Salvadoran government released an amnesty law that would forever 
pardon those involved in crimes during the civil war.  The law granted “full, absolute and 
unconditional amnesty to all those who participated in any way in the commission, prior to 
January 1, 1992, of political crimes or common crimes linked to political crimes or common 
crimes, in which the number of persons involved is no less than twenty.”85  Essentially, no case 
could be adjudicated in domestic courts if the claim was based on facts taking place between 
1980 and 1991.   
Like many other states in the system, El Salvador accepted the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisdiction on a conditional basis.  The Secretary General of the OAS accepted the temporal 
restriction imposed by El Salvador in 1995, when the country submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Court.  In El Salvador’s “declaration,” the State expressly stated that it would accept jurisdiction 
only: 
                                                 
81 Truth Commission Report, supra note 79, at 10. 
82 Id. at 27. 
83 Id. at 11. 
84 Id.  
85 Ley de Amnistía General para la Consolidación de la Paz [General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace], 
Decreto No. 486 de fecha 20 de marzo de 1993, publicado el 22 de marzo de 1993 available at 
www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/1841.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
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For an indefinite term, under the condition of reciprocity and with the express 
reservation that, in cases where the court’s competence is recognized, the Court 
shall have jurisdiction only and exclusively over facts or judicial acts taking place 
after, or those facts or judicial acts which began  after the declaration of 
acceptance of the Court’s competence was deposited. This “reservation” excludes 
from the jurisdiction of the Court the facts or judicial acts occurring or beginning 
before the deposit date of said declaration.86    
 
In this document, El Salvador attempted to exclude from the Court’s jurisdiction any case arising 
out of the -Civil war.87 This temporal limitation proved decisive in a case brought against El 
Salvador by the family members of two missing girls, Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz.  
Ultimately, El Salvador’s conditional acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction substantially 
impacted the Court’s decision. 
B. Facts of the Case 
 Although the facts of the Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz case are convoluted, the abuse of 
the victims is clear.  In early summer of 1982, Erlinda and Ernestina Serrano, who at that time 
were 3 and 7 years old, disappeared from Chalatenango, El Salvador.88  They were last seen 
                                                 
86 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs. El Salvador [Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador], (Preliminary Objections), 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of November 23, 2004, (ser. C) No. 118, ¶ 54(a) (2004). The Spanish text of this 
paragraph is:  
El “instrumento de ratificación de aceptación de competencia de la Corte”, depositado por El 
Salvador el 6 de junio de 1995 en la Secretaría General de la OEA, reconoce la competencia de la 
Corte “por un plazo indefinido, bajo condición de reciprocidad y con la reserva expresa de que en 
los casos en que se reconoce la competencia de la Corte comprende sola y exclusivamente los 
hechos o actos jurídicos posteriores o hechos o actos jurídicos cuyo principio de ejecución sean 
posteriores a la fecha de depósito de la declaración de aceptación” de la competencia.  Esta 
“reserva” excluye de la competencia de la Corte los hechos o actos jurídicos que sean anteriores a 
la fecha de depósito de dicha declaración o cuyo principio de ejecución no sea posterior a esa 
fecha.   
Id.  Note to reader: All translations, unless otherwise noted, are by the author. 
87 An issue disputed before the Court that will not be further discussed in this paper, but which is a valid critique of 
the reservation, is the vagueness with which El Salvador evoked Article 62 of the American Convention.  See Las 
Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 56(c).  Though it is able to restrict jurisdiction 
based on specific facts, specific time, or on the condition of reciprocity, it was unclear as to which provision its 
limitation targeted.  Id.  The representatives alleged that the limitation to specific cases lacked the required 
specificity of types of cases.  Id.  They also argued that the reservation was not reciprocal.  Id.  Thus, the only 
somewhat valid element of El Salvador’s document was the limitation with respect to time.  Id.  
88 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs. El Salvador [Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador], (Merits), Judgment of March 
1, 2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., , (ser. C) No. 120, at ¶ 48(2) (2005), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf/seriec_120_esp.pdf (last visited May 30, 2006). 
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almost 24 years ago, when the Armed Forces of El Salvador took them via helicopter from their 
town.89  Some confusion exists as to whether the girls were delivered either to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross or to the Red Cross of El Salvador, but the Commission was unable 
to make a definitive determination to that effect.90  What is apparent, however, is that the girls 
disappeared. 
 One of the organizations that represented the girls’ family before the Inter-American 
system, La Asociación Pro-Búsqueda, received 721 requests from families similarly situated and 
located about one-third of those children.91  Of the thousands of children victimized during the 
conflict, “hundreds were assassinated in massacres committed by the armed forces; others were 
taken after their parents were murdered or after becoming separated from them during army 
attacks on their villages. Some were taken to orphanages, others were given up for adoption 
either within El Salvador or abroad, including the United States, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom.”92  La Asociación Pro-Búsqueda suspected that the girls were a part of this 
latter group.93
With respect to the Serrano Cruz investigation, the Commission concluded that the State 
had “not even minimally demonstrated that it had developed an investigation with the 
possibilities of discovering what had happened [to the girls.]”94  The Commission further 
accused the State of limiting its investigation by acts that were merely a mechanical repetition of 
                                                 
89 See id. ¶ 2. 
90 See id. ¶ 2. 
91 See id. ¶ 48(6). 
92 Amnesty Int’l, El Salvador: Where are the Disappeared Children?, AI Index AMR 29/004/2003, July 30, 2003 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr290042003 (last visited Dec. 18, 2005). 
93 Milton Aparicio, Remarks at La Asociación Pro-Búsqueda Headquarters in San Salvador, El Salvador (Jan. 6, 
2005). 
94 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Merits), supra note 88, ¶ 49(b). (“El Estado…ni demostró mínamamente que 
hubiera desarrollado una investigación con la posibilidad de determinar lo acontecedido.”). 
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steps, without a true intent to investigate, clarify the facts, and sanction those responsible.95  
According to the Commission, the State was culpable because the “fundamental elements” 
needed for the investigation clearly were under El Salvador’s control.”96  Moreover, the 
Commission alleged that this was part of a pattern of forced disappearances during the armed 
conflict that the State either perpetrated or tolerated.97
 Because the girls’ location remained unknown, their family members, represented by La 
Asociación Pro-Búsqueda and the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), brought the 
case to the Inter-American Court.  Importantly, the case sought to vindicate the rights both of the 
Serrano Cruz sisters themselves and of their surviving family members.98  Some of the alleged 
violations of the American Convention with respect to the girls were articles: 4 (right to life), 7 
(right to personal liberty), 18 (right to a name), and 19 (right of the child).99  As always, these 
were alleged in relation to article 1.1 (the obligation of the State to respect the rights recognized 
in the Convention).100  Possible violations of the family’s rights included violations of article 5 
(right to personal integrity), 8 (judicial guarantees), 17 (protection of the family), and 25 
(protection judicial), also in relation to article 1.1.101  The initial complaint was submitted to the 
                                                 
95 Id. ¶ 49(c) (“En sus observaciones sobre el fondo del caso […] el Estado se limitó a relatar una investigación 
caraacterizada por la repetición mecánica de actuaciones, sin el impulso que demuestre la voluntad de investigar, 
esclarecer los hechos, y sancionar a los responsables.”). 
96 Id. ¶ 49(c) (“Todo ello a pesar de que los elementos fundamentals para la averiguación estaban plenamente bajo 
su control.”) 
97 Id. ¶ 2. 
98 Pursuant to Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court, the next of kin of the victims in 
question may bring a case on their behalf.  Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
(2003), art. 60, in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 17.  However, the “victims” in this case include the girls and also 
their family members who had suffered due to their prolonged absence. 
99 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Merits), supra note 88, ¶ 2. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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Inter-American Court on June 14, 2003.102  By November of 2004, the Court was hearing 
preliminary objections by the State.103  
C. Preliminary Objections: The Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz Court’s Holding 
After hearing preliminary objections in the case, the Court decided, in a vote of six to 
one, to uphold the objection of the lack of ratione temporis.104   The Court found that the 
temporal restriction could not be considered a reservation.  To support this assertion, the Inter-
American Court referred back to its holding in the case of Martín del Campo Dodd v. Mexico,105 
where it had stated:  
The recognition of the jurisdiction of the Court is a unilateral act of every State, 
conditioned on the terms of the American Convention in its entirety.  As a result, 
this is not an issue of reservations.  If a doctrine discusses reservations, upon 
recognizing the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, it is dealing with, in 
reality, the limitations of the recognition of this jurisdiction and not technically 
with reservations of a multilateral treaty.106
 
The Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz Court interpreted El Salvador’s limitation as an instrument that 
solely limited the competence of the Court within the guidelines set out by Article 62 of the 
Convention, and not as more, as the representatives had argued.107   
                                                 
102 Id. ¶ 3. 
103 Id. ¶ 21. 
104 Brazilian judge Cançado Trinidade wrote a strong dissent in the preliminary objections phase.  See generally Las 
Hermanas Serrano Cruz [Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador] (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
Judgment of November 23, 2004, (ser. C) No. 118 (2004) (Trindade, J., dissenting). 
105 Alfonso Martín del Campo Dodd vs. Mexico (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of Sept. 3, 2004, Series C, No. 
113, ¶ 68 (2004). 
106 See Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 61 (citing Alfonso Martín del Campo 
Dodd vs. Mexico (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of Sept. 3, 2004, Series C, No. 113, ¶ 68 (2004)).  The 
Spanish text of this paragraph provides:  
[El] reconocimiento de la competencia” de la Corte […] es un acto unilateral de cada Estado[,] 
condicionado por los términos de la propia Convención Americana como un todo y, por lo tanto, 
no está sujeta a reservas.  Si bien alguna doctrina habla de “reservas” al reconocimiento de la 
competencia de un tribunal internacional, se trata, en realidad, de limitaciones al reconocimiento 
de esa competencia y no técnicamente de reservas a un tratado multilateral. 
Id. 
107 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 62 (“Es decir, El Salvador utilizó la 
facultad estipulada en el artículo 62 de dicho tratado y estableció una limitación temporal respecto de los casos que 
podrían someterse al conocimiento del Tribunal.”). 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 103 (2006). 
 
 This distinction is critical because classifying the limitation as a reservation rather than a 
declaration would have contextualized the document within the guidelines of the Vienna 
Convention.  Thus, by labeling El Salvador’s limitation a “declaration,” the document no longer 
would need to be assessed within Article 19’s framework.  Specifically, as a “declaration,” the 
limitation would not need to pass the “object and purpose” test laid out in the Genocide 
Convention case and Article 19. 
The Court acknowledged that in other cases it had found such limitations to be against 
the object and purpose of the American Convention,108 but it found this temporal limitation to 
the Court’s jurisdiction to be valid under Article 62.109  Unfortunately, the Court excluded claims 
that involved many of the more central alleged breaches of human rights with relation to the 
Serrano Cruz sisters themselves.  The Court omitted article 4 (right to life), article 5 (right to 
humane treatment), and article 7 (right to personal liberty) with respect to the girls.110  This 
bundle of rights also encompassed the act of forced disappearance, upon which the Court 
expressly declined to rule.111  However, the Court did admit the family’s claims under article 8 
(right to a fair trial) and article 25 (right to judical protection).112  Eventually, the Court held on 
the merits that El Salvador was responsible for breaching its duties under articles 8(1) (right to a 
fair trial) and 25 (right to judicial protection), with respect to the girls and the family, and article 
5 (right to humane treatment) with respect only to the family.113  Although culpability was 
                                                 
108 See id. ¶ 75; see also Constantine v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
Judgment of September 1, 2001, (ser. C) No. 82, ¶ 79 (2001); Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Preliminary 
Exceptions), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of Sept. 1, 2001, (ser. C) No. 80, ¶ 88 (2001). 
109 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 73.  
110 Id. ¶ 77. 
111 Id. ¶ 79.  Again, the Court decided not to rule on this claim because it believed that this continuing crime, with 
acts beginning well before the submission to the court’s jurisdiction, was excluded via El Salvador’s temporal 
limitation.  Id. 
112 Id. ¶ 80. 
113 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Merits), supra note 88, ¶ 218. 
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placed on the State, the representatives enjoyed only a pyrrhic victory because of the enormous 
losses suffered in the preliminary objections phase of the case. 
D. Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz: A Critique 
Though at first blush El Salvador’s restriction may seem like a fairly straightforward 
temporal limitation, several convoluted legal considerations must be taken into account.  As the 
representatives of the purported victims argued, El Salvador’s preliminary objection should have 
been thrown out for three main reasons.114  First, the document was incorrectly classified as a 
declaration and not as a reservation to the American Convention.  Second, assuming its 
reclassification as a reservation, the temporal limitation would be procedurally invalid.  Finally, 
the reservation’s effects and content were against the object and purpose of the American 
Convention.   
1. Improper Classification as a Declaration 
One of the most crucial decisions the Inter-American Court made in the Las Hermanas 
Serrano Cruz case was to classify El Salvador’s limitation to ratione temporis as a declaration 
rather than a reservation.  This distinction impacted the case enormously and undoubtedly will 
influence many cases in the future. 
The first element of the Court’s evaluation pertains to the form of the restriction.  The 
language of the limitation alone should have led the Court to classify the document as a 
reservation.  Within its limitation, the State recognized the Court’s jurisdiction “for an indefinite 
term,” but then added “with the express reservation” that jurisdiction should be limited to facts 
occurring after the acceptance of jurisdiction.115  It then later referred to the instrument as “this 
                                                 
114 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 56. 
115 Id. ¶ 54(a). 
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reservation.”116  Moreover, the State again referred to the instrument as a reservation in its 
arguments before the Court.117  The Inter-American Court overlooked this language and did not 
address it in its opinion. 
In addition, the Court failed to consider the effect of the reservation.  As previously 
discussed, an analysis of the effect of such restrictions is required to determine whether the 
restriction is effectively a declaration or a reservation.  A limitation that effectively removes 
binding judicial power from all articles of the American Convention is much more a reservation 
than a conditional interpretive declaration.  The limitation was not a mere clarification of the 
meaning of the treaty, as would be the case if it were a declaration.  The limitation had the effect 
of removing all of the Convention’s substantive protections for facts arising before 1995.118    
Specifically, the Court had no jurisdiction over violations of rights that are non-derogable 
under the American Convention.  Such claims included the rights to: Article 3 (right to juridical 
personality), Article 4 (right to life), Article 5 (right to humane treatment), Article 6 (freedom 
from slavery), Article 9 (freedom from ex post facto laws), Article 12 (freedom of conscience 
and religion), Article 17 (rights of the family), Article 18 (right to a name), Article 19 (rights of 
the child), Article 20 (right to nationality), and Article 23 (right to participate in government), 
and the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights as dictated by Article 
27(2).119  Though some rights otherwise protected under the Convention may be derogable in 
times of war, these particular rights are not severable at any time.120  Therefore, El Salvador 
sidestepped this problem by exempting such violations from the Court’s jurisdiction entirely.   
                                                 
116 Id.   
117 Id. ¶ 54(g), 54(h). 
118 Although the continuing crime of forced disappearance should have been reached on the merits pursuant to 
Vienna Convention article 28 and the exception for facts which have not ceased to exist, that was not a concept 
followed by this court.  Therefore, the effect of the limitation was quite pervasive. 
119 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 27(2). 
120 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 27. 
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2. Improper Procedure 
As a separate issue, the retroactive application of a reservation automatically would make 
the limitation invalid.  If, in fact, El Salvador’s limitation had been found to be a reservation and 
not a declaration, the limitation automatically would fail both under the Vienna Convention and 
under the American Convention.  A reservation only may be made at the time of the signature, 
ratification, acceptance or approval of the treaty pursuant to Article 19 of the Vienna Convention 
and Article 75 of the American Convention.121  Therefore, the temporal limitation should have 
been considered invalid based upon procedure alone.  Thus the Court’s inquiry could have ended 
very early in the preliminary objection phase.  
Reservations must be made at the time a country consents to be bound by the treaty, so El 
Salvador only could have validly reserved the scope of the Court’s competence when it ratified 
the American Convention in 1978.  If the Court had followed this logic, however, both the Las 
Hermanas Serrano Cruz case and other cases involving reservations decided by the Court would 
be called into question.  On the other hand, the Court’s interpretation renders the American 
Convention procedurally contradictory to the Vienna Convention, which does not allow 
reservations to be made at any conceivable time.  Although the American Convention’s Article 
75 procedure on reservations expressly announces that it will follow the Vienna Convention, the 
American Convention allows for limitations to the competence of the Court to be filed “at any 
subsequent time.”122  If El Salvador’s limitation was improperly classified as a declaration and 
truly was a reservation, it would be procedurally impossible to adhere to both Article 62 and 
Article 75 of the American Convention. 
                                                 
121 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 56(c)(i) (“De acuerdo con lo establecido 
en la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, no es posible introducir reservas a un tratado luego de 
su firma, ratificación, aceptación o aprobación.”); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 19.  American 
Convention, supra note 3, art. 75. 
122 American Convention, supra note 3, art. 62(1). 
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3. Object and Purpose Principles 
Finally, the reservation upheld in this case most likely is against the object and purpose of 
the American Convention.  By invalidating reservations that are against the object and purpose 
of the Convention, the Court has worked to safeguard the norms established within the treaty.123 
Specifically, in its Advisory Opinion on reservations, the Court emphasized that states should 
uphold the purpose of human rights treaties while making reservations: 
The Court must emphasize, however, that modern human rights treaties in 
general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of 
the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for 
the mutual benefit of the contracting States.  Their object and purpose is the 
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their 
nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting 
States.  In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, 
assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all 
individuals within their jurisdiction.124
 
Human rights instruments deal with the protection of personal liberties, and these treaties should 
be considered in that light while interpreted and restricted.  Although treaty law generally is 
careful to balance the interests involved, human rights treaties fall into a special category of 
instrument because they deal directly with the protection of human life.  As a result, traditional 
guidelines—such as those created and followed under the Vienna Convention’s attempt to guide 
and encourage state reciprocity—may be insufficient within the context of human rights law.  
Importantly, the Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR has also recognized this concept.  
Specifically, the Committee has stated: 
As indicated above, it is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that 
provides the definition of reservations and also the application of the object and 
purpose test in the absence of other specific provisions. But the Committee 
                                                 
123 Id. art. 1(1). 
124 Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 29 (Sept. 24, 1982). 
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believes that its provisions on the role of State objections in relation to 
reservations are inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human 
rights treaties. Such treaties, and the Covenant specifically, are not a web of inter-
State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of 
individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place, save 
perhaps in the limited context of reservations to declarations on the Committee's 
competence under article 41. And because the operation of the classic rules on 
reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not seen any 
legal interest in or need to object to reservations. The absence of protest by States 
cannot imply that a reservation is either compatible or incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Covenant.125
 
A “particularly troublesome” reservation is one that “seeks to subordinate a human rights treaty 
to domestic law of the reserving state.”126  In effect, this is what El Salvador was doing—though 
not expressly—in its temporal limitation to the Court.  El Salvador already had granted blanket 
amnesty to those responsible for grave human rights abuses during the civil war.  Allowing for 
an exception to the American Convention removes one of the only other legal avenues available 
to victims of human rights abuses, arguably encouraging states to abuse the rights enumerated 
therein.  Indeed, this avenue of redress exists precisely to respond where domestic remedies 
either are de jure or are de facto foreclosed.  Removing the Court as a forum for victims is 
inconsistent with both the substantive and procedural goals of the American Convention. 
More importantly, the Inter-American Court agrees that reservations acting against the 
object and purpose of the American Convention are impermissible.  In the 2001 Hilare v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, one of three cases against that State, the Court interpreted Article 29(a) of 
the American Convention, which states: “No provision of the Convention shall be interpreted as 
permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights 
                                                 
125 UNHCR, General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the 
Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶ 17, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/69c55b086f72957ec12563ed004ecf7a?Opendocument (last visited Jan. 
14, 2006). 
126 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, at 121 (2000). 
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and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is 
provided for herein.”127  “Consequently,” the Court elaborated, 
it would be meaningless to suppose that a State which had freely decided to 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had decided at the same time to 
restrict the exercise of its functions as foreseen in the Convention.  On the 
contrary, the mere acceptance by the State leads to the overwhelming presumption 
that the State will subject itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.128   
 
The Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz Court declined to acknowledge El Salvador’s intention 
to provide those who committed atrocities during the war, and who are still in the government 
and the public eye, with greater protection than that which otherwise would be allowed under the 
American Convention.  Between the amnesty law and the restriction to ratione temporis, nearly 
all criminals guilty of human rights abuses during the civil war were not subject to liability either 
in domestic or in international courts within the region.   
Though the Inter-American Court has no jurisdiction over individual human rights 
abusers, state policies implemented by those individuals may be evaluated before the Court, thus 
implicating individual abuses.  By upholding the temporal limitation, the Court excluded 
innumerable claims of human rights victims and acted against the object and purpose of the 
rights enumerated in the very treaty it is designed to enforce.  As the representatives argued 
before the Inter-American Court, “a reservation that permits a State to continue violating human 
rights without any type of supervision or condemnation is not valid.”129
Intriguingly, the Inter-American Court recognized that this was a relevant issue in the Las 
Hermanas Serrano Cruz case.  In fact, the Court drew a critical distinction between the Las 
Hermanas Serrano Cruz case and the Court’s previous holdings finding limitations on ratione 
                                                 
127 American Convention, supra note 3, art 29(a). 
128 Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Preliminary Objections), supra note 108, ¶ 90. 
129 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 56(b)(i) (“Asimismo, no es válida una 
reserva que permita que un Estado continúe violando los derechos humanos ‘sin ningún tipo de supervisión o 
condena.’”). 
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temporis by classifying similar temporal limitations as too “generalized” and with the specific 
goal of “subordinating the application of the Convention.”130  Specifically, the Court previously 
had found other limitations to be inappropriate based on vague language that evidenced a state’s 
desire to exclude itself from provisions of the American Convention.  However, these previous 
cases included facts that demonstrated clear and express subordination of the American 
Convention.  Three cases evaluated Trinidad’s substantive restrictions to the Convention in favor 
of domestic courts.131  Trinidad made its reservation to the American Convention at the time of 
its adhesion to the treaty132 but later filed a conditional interpretive declaration, which stated:  
As regards Article 62 of the Convention, the Government of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights as stated in said article only to such extent that 
recognition is consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; and provided that any judgment of the Court 
does not infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private 
citizen.133
 
In all three cases against Trinidad and Tobago, the Inter-American Court invalidated the 
country’s interpretive declaration, not the reservation.  The Court could have taken a definitive 
stance on the attempted modification of the death penalty policy in the country accompanied by 
what likely would have been an identical outcome of Trinidad’s denunciation.  Instead, the Court 
                                                 
130 Id. ¶ 75 (“La Corte observa que, a diferencia de este caso, se trató de una limitación con ‘un alcance general, que 
termina por subordinar la aplicación de la Convención al derecho interno . . . en forma total y según lo dispongan 
sus tribunales nacionales.’”). 
131 Constantine v. Trinidad and Tobago (Preliminary Objections), supra note 108, ¶ 79; Benjamin v. Trinidad and 
Tobago (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of Sept. 1, 2001, (ser. C) No. 81, ¶ 79 (2001); 
Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago (Preliminary Exceptions), supra note108, ¶ 88. 
132 The text of Trinidad’s initial reservation is: “As regards Article 4(5) of the Convention the Government of The 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago makes reservation in that under the laws of Trinidad and Tobago there is no 
prohibition against the carrying out a sentence of death on a person over seventy (70) years of age.” Signatures and 
Current Status of Ratifications, in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 17. 
133 Id. 
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classified the declaration as too general and held it to be made in bad faith.134  Conversely, the 
Court in Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz decided that the limitation did not subordinate the Court’s 
capacity to decide certain claims to an extent that it would diminish the power of the Convention 
and the Court.135  
IV. CLOSING THE LAS HERMANAS SERRANO CRUZ LOOPHOLE 
Two main critiques of the Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz decision should serve as 
guideposts for the future.  First, the interpretation of reservations and declarations must include 
adequate consideration of the effects of such limitations.  Second, the procedural mechanisms 
allowed for both processes seem, at this point, both antiquated and inappropriate for the current 
procedures of the Inter-American Court. 
In evaluating El Salvador’s reservation and its effects, the Inter-American Court should 
have placed a higher burden on the State to prove that the State was not merely granting amnesty 
to its guilty for the sake of political motivations and doing so in contravention of the American 
Convention.  Although the Inter-American Court previously ruled on the problem of amnesty in 
Barrios Altos vs. Perú,136 the Court sidestepped amnesty altogether in this case, in the name of 
allowing more parties to submit to the Court’s jurisdiction.  Although allowing greater flexibility 
will encourage states to submit to the Court’s jurisdiction because the states may control the 
subject matter heard at the court, it is also necessary to safeguard non-derogable rights of those 
within the Inter-American system’s jurisdiction. The Barrios Altos decision held the amnesty law 
                                                 
134 Constantine v. Trinidad and Tobago (Preliminary Objections), supra note 108, ¶¶ 80-82; Benjamin v. Trinidad 
and Tobago (Preliminary Objections), supra note 131, ¶¶ 80-82; Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Preliminary 
Objections), supra note 108, ¶¶ 89-91. 
135 Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz (Preliminary Objections), supra note 86, ¶ 75 (“Por el contrario, la aplicación de la 
referida limitación efectuada por El Salvador no queda subordinada a la interpretación que el Estado le otorgue en 
cada caso, sino que corresponde al Tribunal determinar si los hechos sometidos a su conocimiento se encuentran 
bajo la exclusión de la limitación.”). 
136 Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre y otros vs. Perú),  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of March 14, 2001, (ser. C) 
No. 75 (2001) 
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of Perú to be in direct violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, establishing 
such laws as contradictory to the treaty.137  In Judge Sergio García’s concurring opinion in 
Barrios Altos, he stated: 
The Court’s judgment makes it clear that the self-amnesty laws referred to in this 
case are incompatible with the American Convention, which Peru signed and 
ratified, and which is therefore a source of the State’s international obligations, 
entered into in the exercise of its sovereignty.  In my opinion, this incompatibility 
signifies that those laws are null and void, because they are at odds with the 
State’s international commitments. 138
 
However, in the Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz decision, Judge García was silent on the amnesty 
law and the enhanced effect of the Court’s decision.139  
Understandably, the Court likely is concerned with the possibility of states denouncing 
the American Convention.  With Trinidad’s recent denunciation of the Convention, additional 
denunciations from other states arguably are a valid concern for the future of human rights 
protection within the region.  Reservations and declarations can help to protect the system from 
such departures and encourage greater international treaty participation, but excessive limitations 
to the Court’s jurisdiction will continue to result in a dramatic decrease in universality and 
uniformity within the system.  Although this tension is real and must not be ignored, the Court 
should adhere to its purpose and firmly, aggressively, and consistently protect the human rights 
of those individuals within its territory.  It is imperative that the Court take a firm stand and 
demonstrate to State Parties that acceptance of the Court’s competence may not be limited to any 
imaginable scenario.  Strict guidelines must be imposed to protect human rights both 
substantively and procedurally. 
                                                 
137 Id. ¶ 39. 
138 Id. ¶ 15. 
139 In fairness to Judge García, El Salvador’s amnesty law was not specifically challenged before the Inter-American 
Court in this case.  That having been said, El Salvador’s intentions were clear. 
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 Second, the Court’s interpretation of the direct link between the Vienna Convention’s 
guidelines for reservations and the American Convention’s procedures is inconsistent and 
contradictory.  As previously discussed, it is virtually impossible for a state to adhere to both 
Article 62 and Article 75 (which is an adoption of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention) of the 
American Convention.  Currently, states may make reservations after they have ratified the 
American Convention by labeling the limitations as “declarations.”  This circumvention is 
against principles of international law as codified in Article 19 of the Vienna Convention.  
Logically, the Vienna Convention’s procedure was drafted to permit states from changing the 
scope and depth of international norms at their leisure.  A solution to this problem for the Inter-
American system would involve the development of clearer definitions and allowances for 
declarations and their use.  The most desirable result is the prohibition of reservations throughout 
the system wherever non-derogable rights are at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz case has had a detrimental effect on the future of 
human rights adjudication in El Salvador and throughout the Americas. Although La Asociación 
Pro-Búsqueda intends to bring more cases to the Inter-American Commission,140 the Las 
Hermanas Serrano Cruz decision does not allow victims to receive full, meaningful access to 
justice or redress through the Commission and the Inter-American Court.  
 The American Convention was entered into force in 1978, yet it was drafted in 1969.  
Within the context of international law, which is relatively young in comparison to most 
domestic legal systems, this is a substantial amount of time for law to go mostly unchanged.  To 
be sure, “the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights have made significant advances in the protection of human rights in the region.  
                                                 
140 One of these includes claims brought by victims of the El Mozote massacre.  Milton Aparicio, supra note 93. 
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Many of these advances are directly attributable to the evolution of the practice and procedures 
of the Court and the Commission.”141  However, the protection is not yet perfect.  As 
international law transforms and grows, procedural and substantive regulations must be adapted 
to fit current practices.  Although the doctrine of reservations once was appropriate before 
international tribunals, the evolution of human rights law and jurisprudence sets out a trend to the 
contrary.  The prohibition of reservations in the International Criminal Court’s recently ratified 
and drafted Rome Statute142 is instructive. A contemporary reevaluation of the procedures that 
are playing out in human rights tribunals worldwide likely is necessary. 
In the context of human rights law especially, states need clarification so that they may 
adopt their policies accordingly.  Likewise, the interests of human rights victims must be 
balanced against the rights of states.  States’ consent-based, contractual duties must be 
harmonized with the interests of individual, often non-derogable, rights.  Within the Inter-
American system, this process should begin with a re-evaluation of the American Convention for 
Human Rights. 
                                                 
141 PASQUALUCCI, supra note 31, at 349. 
142 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, (entered into force 
July 1, 2002) available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
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